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UTILIZING TAX INCENTIVES TO INCREASE GENDER
PARITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS
“Women belong in all places where decisions are being made.”
—Ruth Bader Ginsburg 1
INTRODUCTION
Women are drastically underrepresented in positions of power
and prominence in the United States. As of 2021, women hold only
thirty percent of board seats on the S&P 500.2 The number is much
smaller for private corporations. One study found that in 2020,
women occupied only eleven percent of board seats for private corporations.3 Given these statistics, it is unsurprising that a 2021
study predicts that corporate boards will not reach gender parity
until 2032.4
This underrepresentation matters for several reasons. First, the
lack of gender equity on corporate boards is blatantly sexist. This
disparity should matter for anyone who wants to reduce societal
inequalities. Second, boards with high female representation are
correlated with better outcomes for workers. Notably, there is a
positive correlation between boards with high female

1. Mary Kate Cary, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Experience Shows the Supreme Court
Needs More Women, U.S. NEWS (May 20, 2009), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/
mary-kate-cary/2009/05/20/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-experience-shows-the-supreme-court-nee
ds-more-women [https://perma.cc/VBW3-GYEE] (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg from an interview with USA Today).
2. Ashton Jackson, For the First Time, 30% of All S&P 500 Board Directors Are
Women, CNBC (Oct. 20, 2021, 4:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/20/30percent-of-allsp-500-board-directors-are-women-a-new-landmark.html [https://perma.cc/NC49-L3TE].
3. Ann Shepard & Gené Teare, 2020 Study of Gender Diversity on Private Company
Boards, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Mar. 1, 2021), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/2020-diversity-study-on-private-company-boards/ [https://perma.cc/2SWB-UQBT].
4. Julia Boorstin, At the Current Rate, Corporate Boards Won’t Hit Gender Parity Until
2032, New Report Warns, CNBC (Mar. 5 2021, 9:08 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2021/03/05/corporate-boards-wont-hit-gender-parity-until-2032-new-report-warns.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/E66W-3292] (discussing a study based off of Russell 3000 companies).

75

76

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 56:75

representation and an increased receptiveness to workers’ needs.5
Third, gender-equitable boards help corporate stocks. This is attributed to higher returns on equity and better stock price informativeness.6 Lastly, having more female-led companies may reduce
economic recessions. Research on the 2008 financial crisis indicates that banks run by men took more risks than banks run by
women, leading to a financial recession.7
There is no consensus among scholars as to the best way to bring
about this change. This Comment focuses on three popular proposals. First, this Comment discusses corporate quotas. Quotas are
arguably one of the most effective and efficient policy solutions.
However, quotas directly clash with the American ideal of a limited
government, arguably making quotas infeasible.8 Second, this
Comment discusses disclosures. Disclosures are a popular solution,
but they are popular for many other corporate problems as well,
leading to reduction in effectiveness.9 Third, this Comment mentions a Rooney Rule. While studies indicate positive impacts in the
short term, the data indicates that the impact decreases over time,
making this solution not effective for long term growth.10
There is a need for a policy that is both effective and feasible.
Tax incentives fit this description. This Comment suggests a federal tax deduction for corporations based on the percentage of
women on the corporation’s board of directors. For corporations
whose board is forty to forty-five percent female, the corporation
would get a five percent deduction of their total taxable income.
For corporations whose board is greater than forty-five percent

5. Richard A. Bernardi, Susan M. Bosco & Katie M. Vassill, Does Female Representation on Boards of Directors Associate with Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work for” List?,
45 BUS. & SOC’Y 235 (2006).
6. See Ferdinand A. Gul, Bin Srinidhi & Anthony C. Ng, Does Board Gender Diversity
Improve the Informativeness of Stock Prices?, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 314 (2011); Linda-Eling
Lee, Ric Marshall, Damion Rallis & Matt Moscardi, Women on Boards: Global Trends in
Gender Diversity in Corporate Boards, MSCI (2015), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/04b6f646-d638-4878-9c61-4eb91748a82b [https://perma.cc/Y9NZ-4CKU].
7. Ajay Palvia, Emilia Vahamaa & Sami Vahamaa, Are Female CEOs and Chairwomen More Conservative and Risk Averse? Evidence from the Banking Industry During the
Financial Crisis, 131 J. BUS. ETHICS 577 (2015).
8. Anne L. Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in
the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 38, 45 (2014).
9. CTR. FOR CAP. MKT. COMPETITIVENESS, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS:
ENSURING A BALANCED SYSTEM THAT INFORMS AND PROTECTS INVESTORS AND FACILITATES
CAPITAL FORMATION, 3–4, 18.
10. Neil Paine, The Rooney Rule Isn’t Working Anymore, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 14,
2020, 3:17 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-rooney-rule-isnt-working-anymore/
[https://perma.cc/G66R-GS9G].
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female, the corporation would get a ten percent deduction of their
total taxable income. These deductions are capped at one million
dollars, and the deductions apply to both public and private corporations.
Tax incentives are both effective and feasible. American corporations are highly responsive to tax incentives, as evidenced by
fifty-five of the largest corporations paying nothing in federal income taxes in 2020 due to their usage of tax incentives.11 Further,
taxes are arguably more feasible than other policy solutions, because taxes are often misunderstood and easier to pass than traditional policies.12
While this Comment proposes tax incentives as a potential solution for gender equitable boards, the concepts in this Comment apply to other types of diversity. It is important to acknowledge that
women are surpassing other diverse communities in terms of their
board representation. Corporate boards are lacking in essentially
every diversity category, most notably people of color.13 Despite
people of color making up forty percent of the United States population, only about thirteen percent of board seats are filled with
people of color.14 Directors from these backgrounds are also less
likely to have board positions with a lot of influence.15 Notably, directors of color are even less likely to serve as the board chair or
heads of board committees, highlighting the racial disparity on corporate boards.16
Other diverse communities, such as the LGBTQ+ community,
have received even less attention. Statistics regarding LGBTQ+
board members are lacking, but one study estimated that only
0.3% of Fortune 500 board members were openly LGBTQ+ in
2020.17 Corporations need to increase diversity for obviously more
than just women. Given time limitations, this Comment focuses
11. Matthew Gardner & Steve Wamhoff, 55 Corporations Paid $0 in Federal Taxes on
2020 Profits, INST. OF TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y (Apr. 2, 2021), https://itep.org/55-profitable-cor
porations-zero-corporate-tax/ [https://perma.cc/6RVU-33DZ].
12. Alstott, supra note 8, at 46.
13. Peter Eavis, Diversity Push Barely Budges Corporate Boards to 12.5%, Survey
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/business/econo
my/corporate-boards-black-hispanic-directors.html [https://perma.cc/TZ2N-FDMK].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Workplace Issues (Quick Take), CATALYST
(June 1, 2021), https://www.catalyst.org/research/lesbian-gay-bisexual-and-transgenderworkplace-issues/ [https://perma.cc/744H-SNEV].
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exclusively on women. However, these same principles can and
should be applied to other forms of diversity.
Part I of this Comment discusses the current gender composition
on corporate boards. There is no definitive explanation for the lack
of gender diversity, but studies generally show positive impacts of
having more gender equitable boards. Part II discusses existing
proposals, focusing on quotas, disclosures, and a Rooney Rule. Quotas are politically infeasible while disclosures and a Rooney Rule
are not highly effective. Part III discusses the structure of the proposed tax incentive, explaining the rationale behind the structure.
Although this specific proposal is novel, tax incentives are generally both feasible and effective.
I. CURRENT STATUS OF GENDER EQUITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS
IN THE UNITED STATES
Corporate boards are dominated by men, resulting in women
having little power in corporate America. Coming up with solutions, however, can be difficult without knowing why these solutions are needed. This Part first focuses on the current state of corporate boards, discussing the slow rate of diversity growth. Then,
the common justifications behind the gender disparity are discussed, with a focus on sexism and homophily, a fear of change,
and a pipeline issue. Next, this Part discusses the impact of inequitable boards on workers, stocks, and society at large. Lastly, this
Part ends with the justification for governmental intervention.
A. The Current State of Women on Corporate Boards
Women are historically underrepresented in powerful positions.
Given that corporate boards are arguably the most influential and
powerful positions in the corporate world, the gender disparity on
corporate boards is unsurprising. This section discusses the current statistics on board diversity, focusing on the slow rate of
growth.
Starting in the 1970s and continuing into the 1990s, “women
made serious progress in the workplace” but the progress has since
stalled, “especially at the top.”18 As a result, as of June 2021,
18. Emily Bazelon, A Seat at The Head of the Table, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/02/21/magazine/women-corporate-america.html
[https://perma.cc/98NB-H7QC].
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women hold only thirty percent of board seats on the S&P 500.19
The number is even smaller for private corporations, with women
occupying only eleven percent of board seats for private corporations.20 Some articles celebrate this growth, arguing that this is the
result of “positive board trends.”21 Given that in 2015 women occupied only nineteen percent of board seats on the S&P 500, these
articles are not wrong.22 Women are gaining more board seats. The
problem, however, is the rate of growth.
While women gained almost fourteen percentage points in the
last six years, this growth is not fast enough. A 2021 study predicts
that corporate boards will not reach gender parity until 2032.23
This is two years later than the firm predicted in 2020.24 Waiting
another ten years is not something that society should celebrate.
B. The “Justification” for Male-Dominated Corporate Boards
This section discusses the three main justifications provided for
male-dominated corporate boards.25 First, sexism and homophily
filter out women from board positions. Second, directors have a
fear of change, reducing diversity hires. Third, there is a pipeline
issue, leading to a smaller pool of women in the traditional positions that directors are picked from.
Arguably, the simplest and most persuasive reason for the lack
of gender parity is sexism.26 Sexist ideology likely prevents women
from advancing in the corporate world.27 Homophily—the tendency
for like to associate with like—is another likely contributor to the

19. Jackson, supra note 2.
20. Shepard & Teare, supra note 3.
21. Laura Berger, The Rise of Women in Corporate Boardrooms, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2019,
8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescoachescouncil/2019/02/13/the-rise-of-womenin-corporate-boardrooms/?sh=3b042cf64085 [https://perma.cc/7WJ3-GGBC].
22. Id.
23. Boorstin, supra note 4.
24. Id.
25. Some studies have also found a correlation between female representation and negative consequences. For instance, one study found that gender diversity is shown to correlate with idiosyncratic volatility. Gul et al., supra note 6. However, many more studies indicate positive benefits, which is why this Comment does not focus on this as a justification.
26. See Yannick Thams, Bari L. Bendell & Siri Terjesen, Explaining Women’s Presence
on Corporate Boards: The Institutionalization of Progress Gender-Related Policies, 86 J.
BUS. RSCH. 130, 133 (2018) (“Research indicates that gender discrimination is a major factor
holding women back from leadership positions . . . .”).
27. See id.
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gender disparity.28 Directors are usually most comfortable with
other people that they are similar to, leading to directors favoring
and picking new board members who are similar to them.29 While
homophily is not sexist per se, this comfort likely stems from inherent sexism within society.
Another related concept is directors’ fear of change. One study
conducted on boards found that CEOs fear advocating for board
members that are demographically diverse because they are more
likely to challenge the CEO.30 CEOs also tend to advocate for board
members that they already know, because they desire to have a
good relationship and to know exactly how the new board member
will act.31 Given that most CEOs are men, the preference for a
“safe” board member is almost always another man.32 Female directors are still atypical, and many CEOs appear to have a fear of
the unknown, likely driving the gender inequity of boards.
The last common justification for inequitable boards is a pipeline
issue. Corporations tend to pick their board members from “particular portions of corporate America.”33 Board members are often
corporate officers, either of that corporation or another corporation.34 As of 2021, only eight percent of CEOs in Fortune 500 corporations are women.35 This lack of depth of women in executive
positions helps explain the relatively low level of women on corporate boards.36
However, the lack of depth of women in qualified positions is not
due to a lack of ambition or a lack of education. Fifty-four percent
of working U.S. women identity as “very ambitious” about their career.37 Additionally, nearly sixty percent of bachelor’s and master’s
28. Martin J. Conyon & Mark R. Muldoon, The Small World of Corporate Boards, 33 J.
BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1321, 1324, 1340 (2006).
29. See id.
30. Stefanie K. Johnson & Kimberly Davis, CEOs Explain How They Gender-Balanced
Their Boards, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/ceos-explain-howthey-gender-balanced-their-boards [https://perma.cc/CR9U-GXFM].
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and
Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 599 (2006).
34. Id. at 600.
35. Katharina Buchholz, Only 15 Percent of CEOs at Fortune 500 Companies Are Female, STATISTA (Mar. 8, 2022), https://www.statista.com/chart/13995/female-ceos-in-fortune-500-companies/ [https://perma.cc/MZR9-JWP8].
36. Fairfax, supra note 33, at 600.
37. Courtney Connley, Ambition Is Not the Problem: Women Want the Top Jobs—They
Just Don’t Get Them, CNBC (Mar. 5, 2020, 2:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/05/why-
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degrees awarded in the U.S. are to women.38 Despite this ambition
and education, a 2019 study found that for every one hundred men
promoted and hired to a manger position, only seventy-two women
were hired for the same role.39 This inequitable promotion system
is then filtering up to the CEOs, resulting in an extremely low percentage of female CEOs.40 Research indicates that the most obvious explanation for this disparity is bias.41
This section highlighted that there is no one distinct reason for
the gender disparity on corporate boards. Sexism and homophily,
a fear of change, and pipeline issues are all related yet distinct
causes. Likely, a combination of all these causes is leading to the
gender disparity. Despite some uncertainty of the cause, the effect
is well known: women lack power in corporate America.
C. The Impact of Female Directors
Although the cause of gender inequality on corporate boards is
unknown, numerous studies have tried to figure out the impact of
female directors. This section will first discuss the impact on workers, arguing that boards with more directors are more receptive to
workers’ needs. It will then turn to the benefits for corporations,
discussing how female directors are correlated with benefits for
stock prices. Lastly, this section will discuss the wider societal impact, focusing on banks run by men and their tendency to take
risks, leading to the 2008 recession.
1. The Impact on Workers
Gender equitable boards are associated with benefits for workers. For instance, boards with more female representation are
more receptive to workers’ needs.42 One study examined Fortune’s
“100 Best Companies to Work For” list and found a link between
the degree of women on boards and the firm’s receptiveness to
worker needs.43 Essentially, firms with a higher representation of
women have an “increased commitment [to] a quality [work]
women-are-locked-out-of-top-jobs-despite-having-high-ambition.html [https://perma.cc/MC
A9-EGB6].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Buchholz, supra note 35.
41. See id.
42. See Bernardi et al., supra note 5, at 244.
43. Id. at 235.
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environment,” earning the characteristics necessary to establish a
spot on Fortune’s list.44
The study also found that employee perceptions are often more
positive at companies with more female board members.45 These
findings suggest that the increased presence of women on corporate boards is correlated to a higher likelihood of guaranteeing a
spot on the list.46 The study speculates that this is because female
board members care more about social responsibility, notably family-oriented benefits such as day-care assistance and flexible
scheduling.47
Other studies have found a correlation between female directors
and the number of women in other leadership positions within the
corporation.48 It is hypothesized that female directors inspire
lower-ranked women within the corporation to “achieve and stay
with [the] firm.”49 Women on boards often network with other
women within the corporation and typically serve as speakers for
firm events, giving lower-level women in the corporation the opportunity to form role models of their own gender.50 This enables
these women to believe that their own success is possible, as they
look to the success already achieved by the women on the board.51
2. The Impact on Corporate Stocks
Evidence shows that corporations with more female representation on top management teams experience better financial performance than corporations with the lowest female representation.52
For instance, return on equity—which is a measure of the profitability of a business in relation to equity—is higher on average for
corporations with more female board members.53 One study estimates that corporations with strong female leadership generate a

44. Id.
45. Id. at 244.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Mingzhu Wang & Elisabeth Kelan, The Gender Quota and Female Leadership: Effects of the Norwegian Gender Quota on Board Chairs and CEOs, 117 J. BUS. ETHICS 449,
463 (2013). This study found a correlation, not a causation. Id.
49. Siri Terjesen, Ruth Sealy & Val Singh, Women Directors on Corporate Boards: A
Review and Research Agenda, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 320, 334 (2009).
50. Id. at 331.
51. See id.
52. See Lee et al., supra note 6.
53. Id.
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return on equity of about ten percent per year versus approximately seven percent per year for those without strong female
leadership.54
Another assessment of firm performance is stock prices. One
study identified a positive link between gender diversity on corporate boards and stock price informativeness.55 Stock price informativeness is the association between stock returns and change in
earnings.56 Corporations with a high informativeness level are
more transparent and may entice more people to invest.57 The rationale offered in the study is that women on corporate boards are
more likely to release voluntary public disclosures.58 The argument
is that more public disclosures are associated with higher stock
price informativeness, indicating a positive link between gender
equity and firm performance.59
Female board members are also more likely to see the importance of social issues, such as environmental issues.60 While
support of social issues may not directly benefit a corporation’s
stock prices, indirectly corporations benefit because it helps improve the corporation’s image and legitimacy, potentially enticing
more investors. Additionally, having a male-dominated board looks
bad in the current political climate, and increasing gender parity
helps reduce this stigma and improve the corporation’s image.
3. The Impact on Broader Society
Evidence shows that behavioral differences between men and
women may affect financial decisions in a professional setting.61
For instance, banks with female CEOs were less likely to fail during the 2008 financial crisis.62 By making decisions that can impact
recessions, these behavior differences therefore can impact virtually every part of American society.

54. Id.
55. Gul et al., supra note 6.
56. Id. at 319.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 329.
59. Id.
60. THE COLLEGIALITY CONUNDRUM: FINDING BALANCE IN THE BOARDROOM, PWC’S
2019 ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY 19 (2019) [hereinafter PWC REPORT].
61. Palvia et al., supra note 7, at 579.
62. Id. at 592.
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Female-led banks were less likely to fail because women are generally more conservative and less inclined to take extreme risks
than men.63 Other studies unrelated to the 2008 crisis have found
similar results, with these studies showing that women are generally less motivated by empire building and therefore make more
cautious decisions.64 The tendency of men to be overconfident is
therefore a liability, leading to risky decisions that have the potential to cause world-wide recessions.
D. Justification for Policy Intervention
There is currently no federal law encouraging gender diversity
on corporate boards.65 Corporations have the sole responsibility of
reducing the gender disparity. This section will first focus on the
slow rate of growth, pointing out that despite recent improvements, growth is still too slow. Next, this section will discuss the
growing societal support for diversity. Lastly, this section will turn
to the resistance that current directors have to adding more
women, showing that despite societal support, directors are resistant to change.
1. The Slow Increase of Diverse Boards
Stating that progress is slow may seem unconvincing given that
numerous studies indicate that female representation on boards is
increasing.66 For instance, the Alliance for Board Diversity estimates that 15.7% of Fortune 500 boards were female in 2010 and
that this number has grown to 21.9% in 2018.67 Additionally, major
companies, such as Facebook, have recently announced that they
are making gender a priority for new board membership.68

63. Id.
64. Maurice Levi, Kai Li & Feng Zhang, Director Gender and Mergers and Acquisitions,
28 J. CORP. FIN. 185, 198 (2014).
65. As of November 2021, California is the only state to have passed a state corporate
quota. See infra note 94.
66. ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2018 BOARD DIVERSITY
CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 34 (2018), https://www.delo
itte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/center-for-board-effectiveness/us-cbe-missingpieces-report-2018-board-diversity-census.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY3R-LR7Q]; Lee et al., supra note 6.
67. ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, supra note 66, at 34.
68. See Rob Price, Facebook, Which Went Public Without Any Women on Its Board, Now
Has 40% Women Directors and Just Added CFO of Estée Lauder and a Former McKinsey
Exec, MARKET INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2020, 6:54 PM), https://markets.businessinsid
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Goldman Sachs has taken it a step farther and recently announced
that they will only help companies go public if they have at least
one diverse board member.69 The company has indicated that their
preference for diversity is women.70 While these recent initiatives
are encouraging, the rate of change is still very slow.71
Additionally, the recent growth in female directors may not be
as great as it initially seems. There is a worry that the increase in
female directors is a result of a few women serving on more boards,
rather than an actual increase in the number of new women serving on overall boards.72 This is known as over-boarding.73 Overboarding is the tendency for America’s top corporations to select
directors who already sit on several other corporate boards.74 Overboarding has several problematic implications, one of which is that
over-boarding reduces the diversity and inclusiveness of corporate
America.75 This means that a small number of women are serving
on several boards, creating a false sense of gender equity.76
2. Society’s Approval of Diversity Initiatives
Gender equity is increasingly a salient issue to most Americans.77 While some people may think that it is undemocratic to
force gender equity through policy initiatives, the existing underrepresentation of a large section of the population is also undemocratic. Seventy-nine percent of Americans think that it is
“very important” for women to have equal rights with men.78
er.com/news/stocks/facebook-appoints-nancy-killefer-tracey-t-travis-board-directors-2020-3
[https://perma.cc/X59Q-EYEU].
69. Hugh Son, Goldman Won’t Take Companies Public Without ‘at Least One Diverse
Board Candidate,’ CEO Says, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2020, 8:15 AM), https://www.cn
bc.com/2020/01/23/goldman-wont-take-companies-public-that-dont-have-at-least-one-diver
se-board-candidate-ceo-says.html [https://perma.cc/NP6Y-USMQ].
70. Id.
71. Boorstin, supra note 4.
72. Kosmas Papadopoulos, Director Overboarding: Global Trends, Definitions, and Impact, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 5, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harva
rd.edu/2019/08/05/director-overboarding-global-trends-definitions-and-impact/ [https://per
ma.cc/6QNYN-3TED].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Rachel Minkin, Most Americans Support Gender Equality, Even If They
Don’t Identify as Feminists, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 14, 2020), https://www.pewre
search.org/facttank/2020/07/14/most-americans-support-gender-equality-even-if-they-dontidentify-as-feminists/ [https://pema.cc/8TH4-VKMW].
78. Id.
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Further, fifty-seven percent of Americans think that the country
has not gone far enough to give women these equal rights.79 Among
those who thinks the country still has work to do regarding gender
equality, sixty-four percent think that a major obstacle to achieving gender equality is the lack of women in positions of power.80
This increasing support for gender equity has convinced many
Americans that women deserve representation in corporate America. This is evident by a poll that found that fifty-nine percent of
Americans think that there are too few women in top executive
business positions.81 It seems that most Americans have made the
connection that the lack of equal rights has resulted in less women
in corporate board seats.
3. Directors’ Hesitance to Diversity Initiatives
While society’s growing support for diversity initiatives is beneficial, it has also made some board directors start to resent board
diversity initiatives.82 Policy intervention is therefore crucial to
achieve gender equity on boards and would show a much-needed
commitment by the American government to reduce gender inequality.
According to a study by PwC, ninety-four percent of board directors state that gender diversity brings unique perspectives and
eighty-seven percent of board directors thinks diversity enhances
board performance.83 However, these board members are also simultaneously becoming disillusioned by diversity mandates. For instance, in 2019, thirty-eight percent of board directors said that
gender diversity is very important, a decrease from 2018 in which
forty-six percent of board directors agreed on the high importance
of diversity.84 That was the first time in over five years that this

79. Id.
80. Juliana Menasce Horowitz & Ruth Igielnik, A Century After Women Gained the
Right to Vote, Majority of Americans See Work to Do on Gender Equality, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(July 7, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/07/07/a-century-after-wom
en-gained-the-right-to-vote-majority-of-americans-see-work-to-do-on-gender-equality/ [http
s://perma.cc/BD84-SJPW].
81. Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik & Kim Parker, Women and Leadership
2018, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/
09/20/women-and-leadership-2018/ [https//perma.cc/4PPJ-D9ZW].
82. PWC REPORT, supra note 60, at 4.
83. Id. at 13.
84. Id.
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question had a decrease in support among board directors.85 Furthermore, sixty-three percent of directors say that investors “devote too much attention to [board gender diversity],” which is a
drastic increase from 2018 in which only thirty-five percent of directors felt this way.86 Despite most directors realizing the benefits
of board diversity, it seems like most directors are tired of the external pressure to increase gender equity on boards.
Even if directors know the importance of diversity, their opinion
of an ideal board is not actually gender equitable. For instance,
only about two percent of directors think that the optimal percentage of female representation on public boards is greater than fifty
percent.87 About sixty-seven percent of directors also somewhat or
very much agree that board will just become naturally diverse over
time.88 Given these opinions, there is no guarantee that women will
achieve gender parity when the projections predict.
Therefore, there is a disconnect between what society wants and
what directors are willing to do. Directors are slower to change
then general society, as evidenced by this resistance to adding
more women. This reluctance is ironic, given that female directors
are correlated with positive benefits for corporate stocks and corporate workers.89
Lastly, it is important to remember that not all Americans support gender diversity initiatives. Some Americans likely oppose
gender diversity because of an inherent sexist ideology, and other
Americans likely are merely opposed to policies that try to increase
gender parity. This is because a resistance to policy is surprisingly
common in America, causing change to typically occur “almost entirely from private initiatives.”90 This is in direct contrast to Europe, in which change is “predominately driven by public policy.”91
Americans are primed to oppose policies, especially if the policy is
seen as an overreach of the government into the business sector.92
Thus, even if most Americans support gender diversity, this does
not mean that most Americans support a gender diversity policy.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 15.
See supra Part I.
Terjesen et al., supra note 49.
Id.
See id.
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Given the slow progress and the resistance by corporations, government intervention is needed to ensure faster and more reliable
progress. By enacting polices that promote female representation
on boards, the government is assuming the role of guarantors, rather than “mere promoters” of equality.93 Governments that enact
policies are showing their willingness to achieve equality and empower women. If left up to corporations to make these changes, it
is predicted to take several years, during which women’s voices will
continue to be underrepresented and drowned out by the
overrepresentation of men.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF POPULAR SOLUTIONS
Gender inequitable boards are an old problem that needs new
solutions. This Part focuses on current proposals to fix board inequalities. First, this Part discusses quotas, arguing that quotas are
effective but not feasible for American society. It will then turn to
the disclosures, discussing how disclosures lose effectiveness with
the addition of every new disclosure. Lastly, this Part will mention
the Rooney Rule, focusing on how this policy is not effective for long
term changes.
A. Corporate Quotas
One option to increase gender diversity is for the government to
impose quotas, requiring that a specific percentage of the board
must be female. Quotas have received a lot of attention in the last
few years. This section will first focus on application of quotas
within society, with a focus on California’s quota. Then, this section
will focus on why quotas are not an ideal solution for the United
States, focusing on the political feasibility and their legality.
1. Quotas in Application
California passed a corporate quota in 2018.94 Since California’s
passage of their corporate quota in 2018, no other state in the
United States has passed a quota. Quotas are therefore new and
rare in the United States. However, internationally, corporate quotas are not quite as novel. Norway enacted the first corporate quota
93. Susan Franceschet & Jennifer M. Piscopo, Equality, Democracy, and the Broadening and Deepening of Gender Quotas, 9 POLS. & GENDER 310, 310 (2013).
94. CAL.CORP. CODE § 301.3 (Deering 2021).
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in 2003.95 By the beginning of 2018, ten other countries had enacted a corporate quota.96
Countries vary in how they structure their corporate quotas. The
differences are mostly in the percentage of women required on the
board and the sanctions for failing to comply with the quota. In
terms of sanctions, Norway requires dissolution of a corporation if
the corporation does not comply with the quota.97 Italy, on the
other hand, requires a fine based on corporate size.98 A few countries take an “‘open seat’ approach,” meaning that corporations
who do not comply with the quota can only fill vacant board seats
with women. 99
California’s quota is similar to the approach taken in Italy. California’s quota requires publicly held corporations to have at least
one female director by the end of 2019.100 By the end of 2021, the
number of female directors is required to increase based on a sliding scale of the total number of directors.101 For instance, corporations with six or more directors are required to have at least three
female directors, while corporations with five directors are required to have two female directors.102 Corporations that do not
comply with the law are fined $100,000 for their first offense and
then $300,000 for every repeat offense.103
2. Why Quotas Are Not an Ideal Solution
In countries that have adopted quotas, they generally produce
positive impacts. For instance, Norway achieved their quota’s minimum of forty percent of females in just one year after the law’s
implementation.104 Several studies have also found a positive correlation between gender quotas and a benefit to the corporation.
For instance, one study examined Norway’s gender quota and
found that after the quota, Norway had a higher number of female

95. Heike Mensi-Klarbach & Cathrine Seierstad, Gender Quotas on Corporate Boards:
Similarities and Differences in Quora Scenarios, 17 EUR. MGMT. REV. 615, 616 (2020).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 619.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (Deering 2021).
101. Id. § 301.3(b).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 301.3(e).
104. Id.
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board chairs and CEOs.105 This indicates that quotas may have a
spill-over effect on other top leadership positions.106
a. Feasibility
However, the biggest downside of quotas is that they are not a
feasible solution for the United States. This is because quotas clash
with American culture by directly interfering with the business
sector. Unsurprisingly, a study found that eighty-three percent of
board directors – including more than fifty percent of female directors – oppose laws, such as quotas, that mandate gender diversity.107 American businesses idolize the free market and investor
choice, meaning that businesses are resistant to the government
dictating the gender of their boards.108 Quotas therefore will “sit
uneasily with deeply-held beliefs” about the role of government in
regulating businesses.109
American culture is heavily influenced by the laissez-faire movement, which is a significant difference from most of the European
countries that have passed gender quotas.110 Given this strong resistance to government interference, gender quotas can easily create resentment and less effective leadership. Some men will inevitably wonder if the females board members are there because of
their merit or because of their gender. This may cause men to question the legitimacy of female board members, potentially then
causing women on boards to begin doubting their own self-worth.
If such an environment of doubt and resentment is fostered, the
effectiveness of female leadership is effectively undermined.
b. Legality
Another issue with quotas is that the Supreme Court has not yet
decided the legality of corporate quotas. Former California Governor Jerry Brown even acknowledged the serious legal concerns
when signing California’s quota law into place, admitting that the

105. Wang & Kelan, supra note 48.
106. Id. at 463.
107. PWC REPORT, supra note 60, at 4.
108. See Alstott, supra note 8, at 45.
109. Id.
110. David R. Howell, The Great Laissez-Faire Experiment, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-great-laissez-faire-experim
ent/ [https://perma.cc/D4VV-QM9T].
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“flaws” may “prove fatal to its ultimate implementation.”111 The
California Chamber of Commerce staunchly opposed the policy, arguing it lacked Constitutional backing.112 Despite these legal challenges, Governor Brown signed the law into place, arguing that the
law was critical to establishing a government that cares about
women.113
Several lawsuits have been filed regarding California’s quota.
Meland v. Weber was filed by the Pacific Legal Foundation in 2019
and argues that quotas are discriminatory against men.114 The
Foundation argues that the law violates the Constitution’s equal
protection clause by forcing corporations to “discriminate on the
basis of sex.”115 The district court initially dismissed the case, holding that shareholders lack standing to sue about the state’s
quota.116 However, the Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed the
district court in June 2021, holding that shareholders have standing.117 The Foundation is going forward with their equal protection
claim, which is currently still pending before the court. Another
lawsuit, Crest v. Padilla, was filed by Judicial Watch and argues
that using the state’s money to enforce the law violates the California Constitution.118 The suit is also currently pending in California state court.
Given the feasibility and legal challenges, corporate quotas are
not an ideal solution for the United States. California’s quota may
encourage other states to pass quotas, but it seems likely that quotas will only pass in states with similar political environments as
California.

111. Jorge L. Ortiz, California’s ‘Giant Step Forward’: Gender-Quotas Law Requires
Women on Corporate Boards, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2018, 7:36 PM), https://www.usatod
ay.com/story/news/2018/09/30/california-law-sets-gender-quotas-corporate-boardrooms/148
2883002/ [https://perma.cc/5FC2-FQV9] (quoting Governor Brown’s statement regarding
the implementation of California’s quota).
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. 2 F.4th 838 (9th Cir. 2021).
115. Id. at 842.
116. Id. at 843.
117. Id. at 849.
118. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 19, Crest v. Padilla, No.
19STCV27561, 2019 WL 3771990 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2019).
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B. Disclosures
Rather than imposing quotas on companies, a second option is
for the government to require companies to publicly disclose information about the diversity of their boards. This section will first
focus on the application of disclosures, with a focus on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements and the
Nasdaq’s new rule for diversity disclosures. Then, this section will
focus on why disclosures are not an ideal solution for the United
States, discussing how the addition of new disclosures reduces the
impact of every existing disclosure.
1. Disclosures in Application
a. Securities and Exchange Commission Requirements
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) governs the
federal disclosure requirements of public corporations.119 In 2009,
the SEC approved a rule that requires public corporations to disclose if their board nominating committee has a policy that considers diversity when considering candidates for a board.120 If there is
a policy, this rule requires the disclosure of how the policy is implemented and how the committee assesses the effectiveness of the
policy.121 In 2019, the SEC issued a regulation to clarify that if a
board considers an individual’s diversity characteristics, the SEC
expects corporations to identify the characteristics and how they
were considered.122 However, the rule notably does not require any
disclosure regarding the demographics of the board.
Some SEC officials have expressed a desire to expand diversity
disclosure requirements. In 2016, then-Chair Mary Jo White said
in a conference keynote address that while the SEC cannot mandate board diversity, diversity disclosures are within the SEC’s authority.123 White said that she wanted to include more

119. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
120. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 240, 249, 274 (2021).
121. Id.
122. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION S-K (2020),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regs-kinterp.htm#116-11 [https://perma.cc/
FZ53-H3CW].
123. Chair Mary Jo White, Address at International Corporate Governance Network Annual Conference (June 27, 2016).
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“meaningful” diversity disclosures in response to the “unacceptable” low-level of board diversity in the United States.124
b. State and Nasdaq Applications
A few states have passed statutes requiring diversity disclosures
for corporate boards. For instance, New York passed a statute in
2020 requiring all corporations incorporated in New York, or authorized to do business in New York, to report the number of
women who serve on their board.125 A few other states have passed
similar disclosure laws, including Maryland.126
In 2020, the Nasdaq stock exchange passed a rule (Rule 5605(f))
requiring all Nasdaq-listed corporations to have, or publicly disclose if they do not have, at least one female director and one director from an underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+ group.127
The rule has some flexibility for small corporations and for corporations with small boards.128 Unlike a quota, this rule does not require corporations to change their boards. Rather, the rule is written as an option, giving corporations the choice between meeting
the diversity requirements and making a disclosure. On August 6,
2021, the SEC approved Nasdaq’s rule.129 A statement released by
SEC commissioners stated that: “[the SEC] support[s] the proposal
because it represents a step forward for investors on board diversity.”130
2. Why Disclosures Are Not an Ideal Solution
There is doubt as to the effectiveness of disclosures. Some people
worry that disclosures, if not done right, can result in information
overload, undermining the effectiveness of the disclosure.131 The
SEC is even aware of this issue, and realizes that more
124. Id.
125. Women on Corporate Boards Study Act, S. 4278, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020).
126. S. 911, 2019 Leg., 439th Sess. (Md. 2019).
127. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS, NASDAQ [hereinafter NASDAQ RULE],
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/nasdaq-5600-series [https://perma.
cc/82H9-W79M].
128. Id.
129. Commissioners Allison Herren Lee & Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on
Nasdaq’s Diversity Proposals (Aug. 6, 2021).
130. Id.
131. CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKET COMPETITIVENESS, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
EFFECTIVENESS: ENSURING A BALANCED SYSTEM THAT INFORMS AND PROTECTS INVESTORS
AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION 3–4, 18.
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information, even when accurate, may result in a less effective use
of information.132
The SEC has spent a lot of time considering how to make disclosures effective, as evidenced by a recommendation report made by
the SEC in 2020.133 The report details all the ways that disclosures
are ineffective, showing that disclosures do not always achieve
their desired results.134 However, the report notably does not mention diversity disclosures.135 Instead, the report focuses on the way
information is presented, highlighting that disclosures effectiveness is largely attributed to their format, rather than their substance.136
Disclosures have increased in popularity in recent years, for a
wide range of topics. For instance, environmental disclosures were
at a record high in 2021.137 Given that disclosures are used for
many important topics, disclosures for gender diversity are not an
ideal solution because they may attribute to disclosure overload.
C. Rooney Rule
A third option is for the government to mandate that companies
implement a Rooney Rule, requiring that companies interview at
least one woman for director positions. This section will first focus
on the applications of Rooney Rules, with a focus on their history
within the National Football League (NFL) and the expanded use
for corporate boards. Then, this section will focus on why a Rooney
Rule is not an ideal solution for the United States, focusing on the
diminished effectiveness for long-term growth.

132. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION ON DISCLOSURE
EFFECTIVENESS 4 (2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/
disclosure-effectiveness.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM2A-2H95].
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. CDP Reports Record Number of Disclosures and Unveils New Strategy to Help Further Tackle Climate and Ecological Emergency, CDP (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.cdp.net/
en/articles/media/cdp-reports-record-number-of-disclosures-and-unveils-new-strategy-to-h
elp-further-tackle-climate-and-ecological-emergency [https://perma.cc/M5GZ-QGLB].
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1. Rooney Rules in Application
a. NFL
The Rooney Rule is originally a NFL policy requiring that teams
interview at least one person of color for head coaching and senior
operation jobs.138 The rule is meant to counter the unconscious bias
that effects the hiring process.139 When decision-makers are not exposed to people of color, it is common for decision makers to rely on
racial stereotypes, albeit often unconsciously.140 However, by forcing decision-makers to interview at least one person of color, the
hope is that decision-makers will alter their biases, therefore making it more likely that people of color are hired for the position.141
When applied to corporate boards, a Rooney Rule could require
that at least one woman is considered in the hiring process of new
board candidates.
The NFL piloted the Rooney Rule in response to the low diversity among their coaches. In 2002, the year before the Rooney Rule
was implemented, only about six percent of games were coached by
a person of color.142 In 2011, the number increased to about twentyseven percent.143 Although this increase was incremental, several
experts thought the increase was primarily attributed to the
Rooney Rule.144 For instance, one study estimates that people of
color were twenty percent more likely to fill a NFL head coaching
job as a result of the Rooney Rule.145
b. Corporate Boards
In response to the success of the Rooney Rule in the NFL, a few
corporations began implementing a Rooney Rule for their board.
For instance, Amazon attracted attention in 2018 for passing a
138. Brian W. Collins, Note, Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices: The Plight
of the Rooney Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 871 (2007).
139. Id. at 872.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Paine, supra note 10.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id.; Cynthia (CC) DuBois, What the NFL Can Teach Congress About Hiring
More Diverse Staffs, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 15, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.
com/features/what-the-nfl-can-teach-congress-about-hiring-more-diverse-staffs/ [https://per
ma.cc/9P6Q-2GNJ].
145. DuBois, supra note 144.
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Rooney Rule for diverse board members.146 Amazon’s Rooney Rule
includes both women and people of color.147 Amazon was initially
resistant to the rule, claiming that it would artificially create the
appearance of diversity.148 However, the Rooney Rule was eventually passed and currently five out of the twelve directors (forty-two
percent) are women.149 This is an increase from thirty percent,
which was the percentage of female directors on Amazon’s board
immediately prior to the passage of the rule.150
2. Why Rooney Rules Are Not an Ideal Solution
Rooney Rules seems to have short term success but the effectiveness declines after a few years.151 This is notably seen in the NFL,
where the Rooney Rule had immediate success but has since declined.152 For instance, in 2019, only about thirteen percent of NFL
games were coached by people of color.153 This is down from 2011,
which had about twenty-seven percent of games coached by people
of color.154 “NFL coaching diversity seems to have hit a wall in recent years,” making people doubt the effectiveness of the Rooney
Rule for the long term.155
While the Rooney Rule does have benefits in the short term, this
policy is not ideal for long term growth. Having an initial increase
in female directors means nothing if men retake these roles in just
a few years. Thus, a Rooney Rule is not ideal solution for increasing
gender diversity.

146. Jason Del Rey, Amazon Will Adopt a ‘Rooney Rule’ to Increase Board Diversity After
Its Initial Opposition Sparked Employee Outrage, VOX (May 14, 2018, 4:49 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/5/14/17353626/amazon-rooney-rule-board-diversity-reversal-sha
reholder-proposal [https://perma.cc/C38X-EFZR].
147. See id.
148. Stefanie K. Johnson, What Amazon’s Board Was Getting Wrong About Diversity and
Hiring, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 14, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/05/what-amazons-board-isgetting-wrong-about-diversity-and-hiring [https://perma.cc/D7QM-ANTY].
149. Officers and Directors, AMAZON, https://ir.aboutamazon.com/officers-and-direc
tors/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M7NR-YPTC].
150. Id.
151. Paine, supra note 10.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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III. USING TAX INCENTIVES TO INCREASE BOARD GENDER EQUITY
Tax incentives are often used in the United States to indirectly
pass social policies.156 For policies that have a hard time passing,
tax incentives may be a better avenue to pursue instead of the traditional policy path. This Part will first outline the tax deduction
proposal. This includes a discussion of the structural considerations behind the proposal. Next, the benefits of using a tax deduction are considered, notably the feasibility and effectiveness.
Lastly, this Part will discuss the drawbacks of using tax deductions, with a focus on the public backlash that corporate tax incentives receive.
A. Tax Deduction Proposal & Structural Considerations
The are many ways to structure a tax incentive. While this Comment suggests one specific way, there are alternative structures
that may work better. This section starts with the basic outline for
the proposed tax deduction. Then, the structural considerations behind each specific part of the proposal are discussed.
1. Tax Deduction Proposal
Although this Comment suggests one policy, there are many
ways to structure a tax incentive. Ideally, economists and tax lawyers will need to analyze the tax incentive before implementation.
This Comment therefore suggests a starting point, acknowledging
that experts are needed to perfect the proposed design.
This Comment recommends a federal tax deduction for corporations based on the percentage of women on the corporation’s board
of directors. For corporations whose board is forty to forty-five percent female, the corporation would get a five percent deduction of
their total taxable income. For corporations whose board is greater
than forty-five percent female, the corporation would get a ten percent deduction of their total taxable income. These deductions are
capped at one million dollars, and the deductions apply to both
public and private corporations.

156.

Alstott, supra note 8, at 45.
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2. Federal vs. State Tax
The easiest determination was choosing a federal tax over state
tax for two reasons. The first reason is that federal corporate taxes
apply to all United States corporations, resulting in a greater impact on board structure nationwide. As determined by 26 U.S.C.
§ 882, foreign corporations that “engaged in trade or business
within the United States” are taxed in addition to businesses incorporated within the United States.157 This means that foreign
corporations that do business within the United States also have
to pay corporate taxes to the federal government, showing the far
reach of federal taxes.
The second reason is that federal taxes are also preferred because they provide an incentive to all corporations within the
United States, regardless of what state the business pays taxes in.
Businesses sometimes try to move states because of tax reasons,
as evidenced by numerous articles online advising businesses of
when to move.158 This is especially relevant after the COVID-19
pandemic, because it is now easier for businesses and people to
move states in response to the increase of remote work.159 However, federal taxes reduce the incentive to move states, because the
tax is applied equally regardless of location.160 This will likely increase support for the deduction, because a federal tax deduction
will not cause a relocation of businesses.
However, this Comment is not trying to suggest that no states
should implement a tax deduction. Rather, this Comment is suggesting that a federal deduction would have the greatest impact
and therefore is preferred. However, states are encouraged to implement their own deductions if the federal government is unwilling to pass this deduction.
157. 26 U.S.C. § 882.
158. Nellie Akalp, How to Move an LLC or Corporation to Another State, FORBES (Sept.
8, 2021, 6:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2021/09/08/how-to-move-an-llcor-corporation-to-another-state/?sh=28a4726a64f5 [https://perma.cc/9HXF-L6FN]; Darla
Mercado, Why You Should Think Twice Before Moving Your Business to a Low-Tax State,
CNBC (Mar. 17, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/16/think-twice-before-mov
ing-your-business-to-a-low-tax-state.html [https://perma.cc/44S2-YMSW].
159. Andrew Osterland, Pandemic Heats Up State Tax Competition to Attract Businesses
and Residents, CNBC (Feb. 8, 2021, 8:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/08/pandemicheats-up-state-tax-competition-to-attract-businesses-residents-.html
[https://perma.cc/PX4M-V7YT].
160. See Jo Willetts, The Difference Between Federal vs State Taxes, JACKSON HEWITT
(Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.jacksonhewitt.com/tax-help/jh-tax-talk/difference-federal-sta
te-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/J9G8-GPD6].
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3. Type of Business Entity
Another consideration is the type of business entity. Business
entities are established by state law. Corporate law in every state
requires that corporations have a board of directors.161 However, in
most states, corporations are the only type of business that requires a board. LLCs are not required to have a board but may
generally make a board if they want to. There are three exceptions
to this: LLC laws of Minnesota, North Dakota, and Tennessee require that LCCs have a board of directors.162 Given that most
states do not require LLCs or any other type of business entity to
have a board, the proposed deduction will only apply to corporations.
While every corporation requires a board of directors, corporations are distinctly divided into two categories: public and private
corporations. Public corporations are publicly traded on stock markets and tend to be larger and more profitable than private corporations. Notably, California’s quota only applies to public corporations.163 However, limiting the tax deduction to public corporations
is a mistake, given that most corporations in the United States are
private.164 Furthermore, as discussed in Part I, the lack of female
directors is hypothesized as a result of less qualified female candidates for board positions.165 By having the deduction apply to private corporations, this will increase the total number of qualified
women, creating a greater impact on other boards.
4. Tax Deductions vs. Tax Credits
Another important consideration is whether the tax incentive
should take the form of a deduction or a credit. A deduction reduces
the amount of taxable income whereas a credit reduces the amount
of money owed.166 Some credits also give a refund even if no taxes
161. Myles L. Mace, The President and the Board of Directors, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.
1972), https://hbr.org/1972/03/the-president-and-the-board-of-directors [https://perma.cc/84
HM-UK62].
162. MINN. STAT. § 322C.0407(4) (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32.1-39(4) (2021); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-249-401(c) (2021).
163. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (Deering 2021).
164. Mary Ellen Biery, 4 Things You Don’t Know About Private Companies, FORBES
(May 26, 2013, 6:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sageworks/2013/05/26/4-things-youdont-know-about-private-companies/?sh=7eb7e0fb291a [https://perma.cc/6FQY-RUU8].
165. Supra Part I.
166. How Credits and Deductions Work, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions-forindividuals [https://perma.cc/23S2-WJF4] (Apr. 8, 2022).
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are owed.167 Most tax experts agree that tax credits are more valuable than tax deductions.168 This is because a tax credit can directly
put cash into someone’s pocket, unlike a tax deduction.169 Further,
a tax deduction only applies if a corporation makes money,
whereas a tax credit may apply regardless of profit. As a result, tax
deductions are often easier to pass because tax deductions are
cheaper for the government. For ease of passage, this Comment
suggests a tax deduction.
5. Percentage vs. Flat Deduction
The proposed deduction is based on a percentage of female directors rather than a flat number. California’s quota uses a flat number, albeit a flat number based on a sliding scale of the total number of directors.170 As stated in Part II, California requires
corporations with six or more directors to have at least three female directors whereas corporations with five or fewer directors
are required to have at least two female directors.171 Although this
number tries to take board size into consideration, the quota becomes less effective the greater the number of total directors.
In 2019, S&P 500 corporations averaged eleven board directors.172 This number has been increasing in recent years, which
some people attribute as a response to the pressure to diversify
boards.173 If a board has eleven directors, three of which are female,
then the percentage of female directors is only about twenty-seven
percent. However, this board is in full compliance with California’s
quota. This is less than the current average of female directors on
S&P 500 boards, which is thirty percent.174 Thus, a deduction
based on a flat rate of women is ineffective for larger boards.
A percentage is a better alternative because the size of the board
is irrelevant. Furthermore, the deduction has two levels, with a
167. Id.
168. Libby Wells, Tax Credits v. Tax Deductions: What’s the Difference?, BANKRATE (Oct.
5, 2021), https://www.bankrate.com/taxes/tax-credit-vs-tax-deduction/ [https://perma.cc/
FUJ8-2LAY].
169. See id.
170. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (Deering 2021).
171. Id.
172. Kerie Kerstetter, S&P 500 Trend Report: Board Composition, Diversity and Beyond,
DILIGENT (Apr. 19, 2019), https://insights.diligent.com/board-composition/sp-500-trend-report-board-composition-diversity-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/A3JN-WZKU].
173. Id.
174. Jackson, supra note 2.
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higher percentage of female directors having a higher deduction.
The lower deduction reflects an almost seven percentage point increase from the current average of thirty percent of female directors.175 However, the increase is not so substantial as to discourage
corporations from changing their board. The higher deduction reflects a substantial increase but was done to reward corporations
that come close or even exceed a board composed of fifty percent
women.
6. Size of Deduction and the Cap
The size of the deduction was the hardest choice in determining
the structure of the tax incentive. The United States has no diversity tax incentive upon which to base this deduction. If the deduction is too small, then it will not incentivize businesses to add more
women. However, if the deduction is too big, the government is unlikely to pass the deduction. 26 U.S. Code § 199(a) allows for some
nonincorporated businesses to deduct twenty percent of their gross
business income.176 Although the deduction does not apply to corporations, it provides a standard regarding deductions that the
government is willing to pass.177 Considering that the proposed deduction only applies to a specific diversity initiative, a range
smaller than twenty percent is likely needed to ensure the deduction passes. The proposed range of five to ten percent was chosen
to balance the feasibility of passage while still trying to adequately
incentive businesses.
Some deductions are capped, meaning that the deduction cannot
exceed a certain limit. For instance, § 179, which is a deduction for
businesses expenses, is capped at one million dollars.178 Based off
this cap, the proposed deduction is also capped at one million.
Given how profitable some businesses are, the deduction is meant
to limit the lost taxable revenue.
However, the deduction was purposely set high in an attempt to
incentive as many businesses as possible. The cap is much bigger
than the penalty imposed by California’s quota, which is currently
set at $100,000 for a first-time violation and $300,000 for any

175. Id.
176. 26 U.S.C. § 199(a).
177. See id.
178. Id. § 179(b)(1).

102

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 56:75

additional violations.179 For corporations grossing millions of dollars of profit, a $100,000 penalty is likely not as strong an incentive
as a one-million-dollar tax deduction. Although a capped deduction
may not incentive the most profitable United States corporations
as much as a non-capped deduction, the highest grossing corporations are typically highly publicized in the media and the news. For
these corporations, public backlash is arguably a more effective
motivation for changing their board structure, as evidenced by recent changes made by highly profitable corporations, such as Amazon and Goldman Sachs, in response to the media.180
B. The Benefits of Tax Incentives
Most Americans prefer the free market, which means that they
want the government to not interfere with businesses.181 This preference for limited interference makes a lot of policies hard to pass.
This section will focus on Americans’ preference for a free market
and why tax incentives are a good solution around this preference.
A 2019 Gallup poll found that only forty-two percent of Americans want an active government and eighty-seven percent of Americans evaluate the term “free enterprise” positively.182 As a result,
many Americans likely operate under the assumption that the
market is better than the government for structuring businesses.
This has likely halted the creation of policies that overtly regulate
the business sector, such as corporate quotas.
The United States “regulates business pervasively—but distinctively—via [the tax system].”183 Despite their technicalities, taxes
are just a type of public policy.184 Tax incentives and penalties are
used extensively in the United States because they “preserve the
appearance of voluntarism” unlike traditional policies.185 Taxes do

179. CAL.CORP. CODE § 301.3(e)(1) (Deering 2021).
180. Chana R. Schoenberger, Boycotts and Corporate Boards, STAN. SOCIAL INNOVATION
REV. (Spring 2021), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/boycotts_and_corporate_boards [https://
perma.cc/T8HG-22TC].
181. Jeffrey M. Jones & Lydia Saad, U.S. Support for More Government Inches Up, but
Not for Socialism, GALLUP (Nov. 18, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/268295/supportgovernment-inches-not-socialism.aspx [https://perma.cc/8D78-XRZF].
182. Id.
183. Alstott, supra note 8, at 45.
184. B. Guy Peters, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 (Blackwell 1991).
185. Alstott, supra note 8, at 45.
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not technically force corporations to act in a particular way.186
However, tax deductions are monetary incentives.187 Given that
businesses are motivated to maximize profit, taxes can play a role
in shaping the decisions of businesses.188
Taxes are also preferred because they face less opposition than
traditional policies.189 This is because tax law is so technical that
most citizens are unaware that the government uses taxes to
achieve policy objectives.190 For instance, the federal government
provides tax incentives to corporations that use alternative fuels
and solar power to improve global warming.191 The government
also uses taxes to punish corporate decisions that they deem harmful, such as excessive compensation for top executives and illegal
bribes and kickbacks.192 Although most Americans are ignorant of
business-focused tax incentives, the business sector is acutely
aware and responsive to changes in the tax law. Many businesses,
especially large ones, optimize their tax incentives, making these
incentives largely successful in shaping business decisions but unlikely to face public backlash.193
C. The Drawbacks of Tax Incentives
Although tax deductions are likely an effective way to increase
gender equity on boards, they come with a cost. Tax deductions decrease the total taxable income, leading to a higher government
deficit. This section will focus on this drawback, highlighting the
recent backlash corporations get when they avoid taxes.
In 2021, seventy-seven percent of Americans stated in a Gallup
poll that they care about the government deficit a “great deal” or a
“fair amount.”194 The government deficit is therefore important to
most voters, potentially making it less likely that Congress will
pass another tax deduction. Corporate tax deductions also contribute to major corporations getting away with paying little or no

186. Id.
187. See id. at 45–46.
188. See id. at 46.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 47.
192. Id. at 47–48.
193. Id. at 46.
194. Federal Budget Deficit, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/147626/federalbudget-deficit.aspx [https://perma.cc/7VKG-RRVU].
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federal taxes despite making millions in profit. In 2020, at least
fifty-five major corporations did not pay any federal taxes, due to
tax loopholes, deductions, and credits.195 This list includes wellknown corporations, such as FedEx and Nike.196 Public outrage
over this issue may discourage Congress from passing another deduction, although as previously mentioned most Americans are
laregely ignorant about technical changes in tax law.
Despite these drawbacks, taxes are still a feasible and practical
alternative to a traditional policy. Although tax deductions decrease taxable income, Congress cares about more than just money
when they make policy decisions. While the deduction will help corporations pay less in taxes, the deduction is a relatively small
amount of the total taxable income.
CONCLUSION
American society has largely grown to favor gender equitable
boards, yet most corporations do not make gender a priority. This
has resulted in the slow growth of female directors, making it essential for the government to enact a policy.197 Corporate quotas,
disclosures, and a Rooney Rule are frequently floated as potential
solutions, yet they either are not feasible or not effective.198 This
Comment proposed a federal tax deduction to encourage the
growth of female directors. Taxes are easier to pass than traditional policies and corporations seem motivated to decrease the
money they pay in taxes.199 Although tax deductions have some
drawbacks, the benefit of achieving gender equality arguably outweighs the negatives.
Future research should also focus on alternative types of diversity. People of color, veterans, the disabled, and members of the
LGBTQ+ community face similar obstacles in achieving representation on corporate boards. Additionally, other types of tax incentives can help achieve gender equity, such as individual tax credits
for daycare and tax credits for reproductive and family planning
services.200 Achieving gender parity on boards is a seemingly
195. Gardner & Wamhoff, supra note 11.
196. Id.
197. Supra Part I.
198. Supra Part II.
199. Supra Part III.
200. Marcello Estevao, Vitor Gaspar, Navid Hanif & Pascal Saint-Amans, How Tax Reform Can Promote Growth and Gender Equality in the Post-COVID Era, PLATFORM FOR
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straightforward goal but has complex solutions. Tax deductions
may not be a perfect solution but there is arguably no perfect way
to correct the inequalities of corporate America. Women’s voices
have gone unheard for too long. Taxes can help change that.
Mary E. Tursi *
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